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1. Introduction 
Human rights claims are often motivated by weighty considerations. But few motivating factors are 
arguably as powerful as those which typically underpin claims involving the right to freedom of 
religion and belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In such 
cases litigants often consider that they have a sacred duty to act (or refrain from acting) in a particular 
way, believing that failure to do so may displease a supreme being or even lead to dire consequences 
in an afterlife, perhaps for all eternity. To date the courts have acknowledged, in express terms, the 
unparalleled and existential significance of particular manifestations of religious belief to believers 
themselves. British judges have made a number of statements in which they have accepted the 
centrality of faith in the lives of those bringing such claims before them, recognising that in view of 
religion’s association with the transcendental, the divine and the eternal, it is the most important thing 
for many people.1 
However, although judges avowedly recognise the subjective importance of manifestations of 
religious belief, there has been a tendency for the courts to permit such manifestations to be restricted 
by legislatures and governments with relative ease, occasionally in pursuit of seemingly 
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intervening) [2009] EWHC 978 (Admin), [2009] WLR (D) 151, [93]; Lloyd LJ in R (Suryananda) v Welsh 
Ministers [2007] EWCA Civ 893, [83]. 
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inconsequential aims. Accordingly, there exists something of a disconnect within the judicial 
discourse on freedom of religion and belief under Article 9. Although judges say that the 
manifestation of a person’s faith or beliefs is of crucial importance to religious claimants, their words 
appear not always to be matched by their actions, for the ‘public good’ grounds on which the courts 
permit such manifestations to be restricted are, on occasion, incongruously slender. As a result, the 
courts risk appearing disingenuous, and a religious believer may ask, ‘If the court really accepted that 
this manifestation of my belief is as significant to me as it maintains, why restrict it on such flimsy 
grounds?’ 
One particularly credible explanation for this disconnect is the fact that the courts, when adjudicating 
religious rights claims, are obliged to employ only neutral reasons that are accessible to, and graspable 
by, everyone. This judicial obligation is rooted in one of deepest strands of liberal thought, going back 
to the religious conflicts of the seventeenth century and the philosophy of Locke and Spinoza: the 
need for a separation of church and state, so as to ensure respect for the conscience of individuals, and 
to avoid the suppression of minorities.2 An important part of this principle is that, in a democracy, 
people with particular religious beliefs—which are not understood, still less held, by others—should 
not be able to influence the formulation of coercive law and public policy solely on the basis of these 
same beliefs. As Thomas Nagel has put it:  
 
… it must be possible to present to others the basis of your own beliefs, so that once you have 
done so, they have what you have, and can arrive at a judgment on the same basis. That is not 
possible if part of the source of your conviction is personal faith or revelation—because to 
report your faith or revelation to someone else is not to give him what you have, as you do 
when you show him your evidence or give him your arguments.3  
                                                          
2 John Locke, ‘A Letter Concerning Toleration’ (1685) in David Wootton (ed), John Locke: Political 
Writings (Penguin, 1993) 390; Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and a Political Treatise, 
RHM Elwes (trans) (Dover, 2004). 
3 Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy’ (1987) 16 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
215, 232 (emphasis in original). 
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The core reason for this doctrine of restraint is the necessity of preventing unbridled religious 
influence within the public forum leading to the elevation of one religion over other systems of belief 
and, ultimately, to the placing of restrictions on (or even the snuffing out of) the freedoms of others.4  
John Rawls, with whom this theory is usually associated, refers to the type of reason that must be used 
in the public domain as ‘public reason’,5 although others refer to similar (although distinct) concepts 
of ‘secular reason’6 and ‘civic reason’.7 While there has been much criticism of the idea and ideal of 
public reason,8 a general consensus exists on at least one aspect of this theory: that when state 
officials are exercising judicial power they should not let religious views influence their judgments. 
As Rawls observed, the Court is the ‘exemplar of public reason’,9 and today, on matters of religion as 
elsewhere, this point of principle is sufficiently well established to be regarded as a virtual axiom. 
In this article we contend that, whilst correct as a matter of principle, this adherence to public reason 
has certain unforeseen consequences for the adjudication of religious rights, and contributes to the 
disconnect identified above. Even though the courts seem willing to accept that claimants genuinely 
                                                          
4 See Robert Audi, ‘The Separation of Church and State and the Obligation of Citizenship’ (1989) 18 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 259. Moreover, even Kent Greenawalt, who is much more open to the influence 
of religious reasons in the public sphere than Audi, accepts that ‘the legislator should eschew reliance on 
religious premises insofar as he can’: Kent Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Political Choice (Oxford 
University Press, 1988) 237.  
5 John Rawls, Political Liberalism—with New Introduction and ‘Reply to Habermas’ (Columbia 
University Press, 1996). 
6 See Robert Audi, Religious Commitment and Secular Reason (Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
7 See Abdullahi An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia (Harvard 
University Press, 2008). 
8 See eg Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion in Political Issues’ in Robert Audi and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate (Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1997); Jeremy Waldron, ‘Religious Contributions in Public Deliberation’ (1993) 30(4) San 
Diego Law Review 817; Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion (Polity, 2008) ch 5. 
9 Rawls (n 5) 216. This of course goes much further back than Rawls. For example, see Locke (n 2) 405. 
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believe that particular manifestations of religion or belief are of existential importance, they (the 
courts) remain unable to give voice to these beliefs so as to reflect, adequately, the importance placed 
upon them by believers. In short there is an absence of vocabulary—an ineffability—which prevents a 
court in a modern liberal democracy from taking account of manifestations of belief in a way that 
adequately conveys the profundity with which claimants hold these very beliefs.  
This disconnect is closely associated with the sense of unease that appears to characterise judicial 
decision making in respect of religious claims—an unease which often leads, in turn, to the courts 
affording considerable discretion to legislatures and governments when restrictions are imposed on 
manifestations of religious belief.10 Whilst willing to accept the great significance of particular 
manifestations of belief to the claimants themselves, the courts find such manifestations important for 
very different reasons than people of faith. Thus, unlike the believer, for whom the religious 
manifestation or practice is important because they believe the underlying doctrine to be true, judges 
accept that religion is to be valued for reasons such as respect for individual autonomy, collective 
identity or the need for pluralism in a democratic society.11 As a result UK courts have often been 
willing to accept that, notwithstanding the importance of religion to the individuals concerned, 
legislatures and governments are better placed (due to their democratic credentials and/or superior 
expertise) than judges to assess the necessity of restrictions on manifestations of religious belief.12  
In this regard our argument is not that the UK courts have necessarily made the wrong decisions when 
adjudicating on the basis of Article 9 of the ECHR. Rather, it is their reasoning and, in particular, the 
                                                          
10 We use the terms ‘deference’, ‘due deference’, ‘margin of discretion’ and ‘latitude’ interchangeably in 
this article to refer to the ‘area of discretionary judgment’ afforded by domestic courts under the Human Rights 
Act 1998. We use the term ‘margin of appreciation’ only in the context of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights.  
11 See eg Timothy Macklem, ‘Faith as a Secular Value’ (2000) 45(1) McGill Law Journal 1; Kokkinakis v 
Greece (1993) 17 EHRR 397, [31]. 
12 See eg Suryananda (n 1) [79]–[80] (Thomas LJ); R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School 
[2006] UKHL 15, [2005] 5 WLR 3372, [34] (Lord Bingham); [63]–[64] (Lord Hoffmann); [84] (Lord Scott); 
[97] (Baroness Hale).  
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way in which their decisions have been characterised by the affording of judicial deference, that is 
problematic.13 We contend that, in deciding many of the cases under Article 9, the same results could 
have been reached without such excessive margins of discretion being afforded by the judges to the 
executive and/or legislature, since the state’s arguments for restriction in most of these cases would 
have been relatively strong in any case. The courts’ tendency to grant decision-makers a wide margin 
of discretion in the field of religion and belief, has served to muddy further what are (given the 
challenges of accommodating faith in a predominantly secular age) already murky waters, making 
judges appear to be loath to protect religious human rights. Perhaps even more significantly, the use 
of such judicial deference in future Article 9 cases may well have a decisive effect upon their 
outcome, even in those cases where the state’s arguments for restriction are comparatively weak. That 
the risk of this is real can be seen in a case whose particular facts illustrate graphically the 
‘disconnect’ highlighted above, the Administrative Court’s decision in Ghai v Newcastle City 
Council, where a local council’s refusal to allow a Hindu man to be cremated on an outdoor funeral 
pyre was held not to breach Article 9.14 In this case the wide latitude afforded by the court resulted in 
a serious undervaluing of the religious manifestation at stake, in pursuit of a remarkably tenuous 
governmental/legislative aim. The case of Ghai, we suggest, provides a cautionary tale and a timely 
warning of possible problems associated with the affording of due deference in relation to Article 9. If 
the logic of the Administrative Court in Ghai were to inform future adjudication, this would almost 
                                                          
13 Constraints of space demand that, for the purposes of this article, we consider only cases that were 
decided on the basis of Art 9 ECHR, as opposed to ones where the claims were based primarily on 
discrimination law (such as the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Equality Act 
2006, and now the Equality Act 2010), which raise different, albeit oft related, issues. 
14 Ghai (Admin) (n 1). As will be seen, this decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which, as a 
result of its interpretation of the contested provisions, was able to avoid engaging with the human rights 
arguments in the case. See n 90 below. 
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certainly add weight to the arguments of faith leaders who maintain that the UK courts fail to take 
religion seriously.15 
The article is structured in six parts. Part 2 sketches out the doctrine of public reason as developed by 
Rawls and (for the sake of balance) briefly outlines some of the relevant critiques. Part 3 summarises 
Article 9 of the ECHR, with particular reference to the ways in which the UK courts have applied the 
principle of proportionality, and have sanctioned curbs on the manifestation of religious freedom in 
the interests of the public good. Part 4 outlines the Administrative Court’s decision in Ghai v 
Newcastle City Council, a case whose particular facts illustrate, with great clarity, the ‘disconnect’ 
highlighted above. Part 5 suggests why this is a problem, before, tentatively, proposing a way 
forward. Part 6 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Rawls’s Doctrine of Public Reason 
 
A. An Introduction to Public Reason 
John Rawls was undoubtedly ‘one of the most important political philosophers of the twentieth 
century’.16 His work on the issue of public reason provides an especially useful framework for 
examining how the law should respond to religious faith in an increasingly secular age,17 as evidenced 
by the number of scholars who have advanced versions of this theory.18 It was in Political Liberalism 
                                                          
15 See eg the comments of the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey of Clifton, in McFarlane v 
Relate Avon Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ B1, [17]; [2010] ICR 507 (EAT) where he claimed that the judiciary has a 
‘disparaging attitude’ and a ‘clear animus’ towards the ‘Christian faith and its values’. 
16 David Reidy, ‘Rawls’s Religion and Justice as Fairness’ (2010) XXXI History of Political Thought 
309, 310.  
17 Rawls (n 5). See also John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited’ (1997) 64(3) University of 
Chicago Law Review 765. 
18 See eg Audi (n 6); An-Na’im (n 7); Stephen Macedo, ‘In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are 
Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?’(1997) 42 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1; J Bohman, ‘Deliberative 
Toleration’ [2003] Political Theory 759.  
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that John Rawls argued that citizens, when engaged in public discourse about ‘constitutional 
essentials’ and/or ‘matters of basic justice’, owe it to each other to give generally accessible reasons 
for their arguments.19 Thus when citizens in a democracy, who exercise ultimate authority through the 
democratic process, take part in public debate about the coercive powers of the state they should only 
advance reasons for coercion that all reasonable members of society can understand and accept. 
Accordingly, they should not offer reasons based on their own exclusive ‘comprehensive’ world 
views (eg religious beliefs, or philosophical or moral views), that those with alternative world views 
cannot fully comprehend.20  
The starting point for Political Liberalism was an issue left unanswered in Rawls’s earlier work, A 
Theory of Justice:21 the extent to which, in liberal democratic societies, the ‘fact of reasonable 
pluralism’ means it is possible to have a stable and just society of free and equal citizens who are 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines—or as Rawls called 
them, ‘comprehensive doctrines’. Given that the guaranteed rights and freedoms (including those of 
thought, conscience, religion and expression) which liberal democracies protect, typically lead to a 
plurality of incompatible religious, philosophical and moral world views, what is to prevent social 
disintegration?  
Addressing this issue, Rawls argued that since comprehensive doctrines of the good (both religious 
and non-religious) tend to be irreconcilable, citizens will not be able to rely on them in order to reach 
agreement or even mutual understanding. Citizens should be willing to recognise that reasonable 
people may differ profoundly with regard to their conceptions of the human good and views of 
religious truth.22 As a result, citizens should exercise their power only to the extent that they can 
reasonably justify their political decisions to everyone as free and equal members of society; and 
                                                          
19 Rawls (n 5). 
20 Rawls (n 5) xlix, 214. According to Rawls, Political Liberalism is impartial as between various 
competing comprehensive doctrines, and views its own political conception not as ‘true’, but rather as 
‘reasonable’: Rawls (n 5) xi.  
21 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971). 
22 Rawls refers to this as the ‘burdens of judgment’: Rawls (n 5) 54–58.  
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holders of incompatible doctrines should consider what arguments they can reasonably offer to each 
other when questions of coercion are in issue. Thus, Rawls concluded that: 
 
As reasonable and rational, and knowing that they affirm a diversity of reasonable religious 
and philosophical doctrines [citizens] should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to 
one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent 
with their freedom and equality.23 
 
The concept of ‘reciprocity’ is central to Rawls’s scheme: the exercise of political power can only be 
legitimate when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our political actions are 
sufficient, and we reasonably believe that other citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.24 
Accordingly, the motivation that is counted upon lies somewhere between altruism and self-interest, 
or what has been termed a ‘willingness to do your fair share … so long as others will do the same’.25 
Therefore, according to Rawls, Political Liberalism is a ‘free standing’ doctrine having its own 
intrinsic (moral) political ideal expressed by the criterion of reciprocity.26 
For Rawls the duty of public reason is one of ‘civility’ and thereby a ‘moral’ rather than ‘a legal 
duty’,27 which applies to both citizens and public officials28 when they engage in political advocacy in 
the public square on matters of constitutional importance or basic justice (eg the programmes of 
political parties, candidates seeking election and citizens voting).29 However, it does not apply to the 
                                                          
23 Rawls (n 5) 217–18. 
24 Rawls (n 17). On reciprocity see also Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and 
Disagreement (Harvard University Press, 1996). 
25 Macedo (n 18) 12. Rawls envisioned a ‘reasonable overlapping consensus’ of political (ie non-
comprehensive) views among people with different comprehensive views: Rawls (n 5) xlvii–xlviii.  
26 How truly ‘free standing’ the nature of the doctrine is has been called into question, particularly 
because of its reliance on its ‘Enlightenment understanding’ of rationality and reason. See Wolterstorff (n 8) 97–
98. 
27 Rawls (n 17) 769. 
28 Ibid, 768–9. 
29 Rawls (n 5) 215. 
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‘background culture’ of civil society (eg reasoning within associations of all kinds such as churches 
and universities, scientific societies and professional groups).30 What is more, for Rawls the court is 
the ‘exemplar of public reason’: 
 
It is the only branch of government that is visibly on its face the creature of reason alone. 
[The role of judges is to] justify by public reason why they vote as they do, [and] make their 
grounds consistent and fit them into a coherent constitutional view over the whole range of 
decisions.31  
 
As a consequence, judges may invoke neither personal morality (and morality generally) nor their 
own (or other people’s) religious or philosophical views. On the contrary, they must appeal to those 
political values which belong to the most reasonable understanding of the public conception and its 
political values of justice and public reason—values which they believe (in good faith) that all rational 
citizens might reasonably be expected to endorse.32 
 
B. Public Reason: Critiques and Judicial Affirmation 
Notwithstanding its considerable influence,33 Rawls’s theory has been the subject of several weighty 
and wide-ranging criticisms.34 For a start, it appears ill equipped to deal with the situation where 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 220–2. Rawls later modified his position in Political Liberalism, expressing the view that citizens 
(but not courts or legislators) may introduce their comprehensive doctrines into political discussion at any time, 
on the proviso that (in due course) they must give proper public reasons to support their views: Rawls (n 17) 
777.  
31 Rawls (n 5) 235. 
32 Ibid, 236. 
33 See eg Audi (n 6), where it is argued that secular grounds should inform, equally, the reasoning of all 
citizens (both religious and non-religious) wishing to participate in public debate.  
34 See eg Waldron (n 8); Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (Oxford University 
Press, 1995); Jürgen Habermas, ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism’ (1995) XCII (3) Journal of Philosophy 109; Wolterstorff (n 8); Habermas (n 8) 114–48; 
Veit Bader, ‘Secularism, Public Reason or Moderately Agonistic Democracy’ in Geoffrey Brahm Levy and 
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people of faith claim to be under a sacred duty to bring their religious beliefs into the public sphere, 
because the doctrine of public reason prevents them from so doing.35 Furthermore, Rawls’s theory can 
lead to those engaging in public debate downplaying their true ‘religious’ motives, so that people of a 
religious faith find themselves essentially having to ‘pretend’ to be driven by other considerations,36 
which is ‘hardly the standard of transparency toward which democratic debate supposedly strives’.37 
Another critique of the doctrine relates to its exclusivity, on the basis that public debate ‘should be 
open to “all comers” and not simply the preserve of elites’ with the education or ability to construct 
their arguments in appropriate forms.38  
A final criticism of the doctrine of public reason relates to the argument that the various strands of 
liberalism may themselves be seen as secular versions of comprehensive doctrines of the good.39 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Tariq Modood (eds), Secularism, Religion and Multicultural Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
110. For a useful summary of the doctrine and its critiques see Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in 
the Liberal State (Oxford University Press, 2005) 46–54. For a recent defence of public reason and response to 
these criticisms see Stephen Macedo, ‘Public Reason, Democracy, and Political Community: The Critics 
Revisited’, Montreal Neutrality Conference, May 2008, 
www.creum.umontreal.ca/IMG/doc/Macedo_Montreal_Neutrality_Conference_4_25.doc (accessed 30 June 
2011). 
35 See Wolterstorff (n 8) 105; Benjamin L Berger, ‘The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, 
Secularism and the Liberal State’ (2002) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 39, 47. 
36 See Greenawalt (n 34) 7, who argues that this has ‘the unappealing feature of encouraging some 
discrepancy between actual bases of judgment and stated reasons’. 
37 Marion Maddox, ‘An Argument for More, Not Less, Religion in Australian Politics’ (2009) 22(3) 
Australian Religion Studies Review 353.  
38 Bader (n 34) 121–2. Another common observation is that many of the great social reform movements, 
such as the abolition of slavery, or civil rights in the US have been inspired by religions belief, see Michael J 
Sandell, ‘Political Liberalism’ (review of Rawls’s Political Liberalism) (1994) 107(7) Harvard Law Review 
1765, 1791; Wolterstorff (n 8) 110.  
39 See eg John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (Polity, 2000); Rawls (n 5) xxviii–xxx; Rawls (n 17); 
Rawls (n 22). 
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Rawls accepted that ‘justice as fairness’, the theory developed in his earlier Theory of Justice, is an 
example of such a secular comprehensive world view,40 but he maintained that political liberalism, 
with its arguments based on reciprocity and the use of public reason, is a ‘freestanding doctrine’, 
independent of such comprehensive world views.41 In contrast, however, others have argued that even 
the doctrine of public reason cannot truly be said to stand free of comprehensive doctrines, due to the 
fact that it is heavily dependent on an ‘Enlightenment understanding’ of the person, of reason and of 
rationality.42  
Despite these and other doubts as to whether and how Rawls’s doctrine applies to citizens, there is 
nonetheless a general consensus that the courts are, and ought to be, bound by the strictures of public 
reason—that the judiciary is the exemplar of public reason and should eschew any resort to 
comprehensive doctrines.43 Indeed, within the liberal democratic state, this is a principle so well 
ingrained that it is seldom given explicit recognition. Yet one such instance was the forceful riposte of 
Laws LJ recently to a call by the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey of Clifton, for the 
establishment of a specialist panel of judges to adjudicate on claims involving matters pertaining to 
religious freedom:44 
 
… the conferment of any legal protection or preference upon a particular substantive 
moral position on the ground only that it is espoused by the adherents of a particular 
faith, however long its tradition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled. It 
imposes compulsory law, not to advance the general good on objective grounds, but to 
give effect to the force of subjective opinion. This must be so, since in the eye of 
                                                          
40 Rawls (n 17) 806. 
41 See ibid.  
42 See Wolterstorff (n 8) 98–99; Sandell (n 38); Gray (n 39). For a general review of the debate see 
Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Blackwell, 2nd edn 1996). 
43 Kent Greenawalt is an exception, in that, whilst broadly agreeing that the judiciary should not use 
comprehensive reasons, he accepts that in very limited circumstances (eg in very hard cases) they may be 
permitted to do so: Greenawalt (n 34) 148–9. 
44 Lord Carey (n 15). 
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everyone save the believer religious faith is necessarily subjective, being 
incommunicable by any kind of proof or evidence. It may of course be true; but the 
ascertainment of such a truth lies beyond the means by which laws are made in a 
reasonable society. Therefore it lies only in the heart of the believer, who is alone bound 
by it. No one else is or can be so bound, unless by his own free choice he accepts its 
claims. 
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on religious grounds 
cannot therefore be justified. It is irrational, as preferring the subjective over the 
objective. But it is also divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We do not live in a society 
where all the people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religion—
any belief system—cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the 
general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less 
than citizens; and our constitution would be on the way to a theocracy, which is of 
necessity autocratic. The law of a theocracy is dictated without option to the people, not 
made by their judges and governments. The individual conscience is free to accept such 
dictated law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of 
thinking for itself.45 
 
A clearer and more unequivocal judicial exposition of the principle of public reason as it applies to the 
courts is hard to find. Yet the words of Laws LJ are unlikely to assuage the fears of Lord Carey and 
his supporters, not least because ‘the terms of the debate about the place of religion within society are 
set by a secular liberalism that does not and cannot view religion through religion’s own eyes’.46 Such 
considerations may also help to explain why faith groups are often sceptical about the law’s ability to 
protect religious belief in an increasingly secular age—and why, prior to the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (the HRA), claims that the incorporation of Article 9 of the ECHR into UK law 
might paradoxically undermine religious freedom led to (unheeded) calls for faith groups to be 
exempt from the remit of the legislation.47 Today, with the HRA already a decade old, the principle of 
public reason underpins the approach of the courts when adjudicating on religious rights claims under 
                                                          
45 McFarlane v Relate (n 15) [17]. 
46 Anthony Bradney, Law and Faith in a Sceptical Age (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009) 33. 
47 See Peter Cumper, ‘The Protection of Religious Rights under Section 13 of the Human Rights Act 
1998’ [2000] Public Law 254. 
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Article 9. With such considerations in mind it is necessary to explain (briefly) the right to freedom of 
religion and belief under Article 9 of the ECHR, before proceeding to summarise the relevant case 
law in this area. 
 
3. Freedom of Religion and Belief under Article 9 of the ECHR 
A. Article 9: The Constituent Elements 
 
Article 9 of the ECHR provides that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 9(1) protects, in absolute terms, the principle of freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
A person may believe whatever they want because the state has no power to interfere with this 
internal sphere, the forum internum. By contrast, under Article 9(2), the manifestation of religion or 
belief may be subject to restrictions by the state as long as these are ‘prescribed by law’, in pursuance 
of one of the legitimate aims listed, and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. This last requirement has 
been held by the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court) to mean that any restriction 
must be proportionate to the aim that the state is claiming to protect.48 
Various principles can be gleaned from the Article 9 case law of the European Court.49 These in turn 
have been implemented and developed by the domestic courts since the coming into force of the 
                                                          
48 Manoussakis v Greece (1997) 23 EHRR 387, [44]; Şahin v Turkey (2007) 44 EHRR 5, [109]. 
49 See David Harris, Michael O’Boyle, Edward Bates and Carla Buckley, The Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2009) 425–41.  
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Human Rights Act 1998. They have been set down in their clearest form in what is arguably the 
leading UK case in this area—R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment50—
and can be discerned by examining the questions that the court asks (and answers) when dealing with 
an Article 9 claim: is there a ‘religion or belief’ attracting protection under Article 9?; is there a 
‘manifestation’ of that religion or belief?; has it been subjected to a ‘limitation’?; and, if so, is the 
limitation justified under Article 9(2)? As will be observed, the willingness with which the courts 
have been prepared to answer the first two of these questions in the affirmative—in accepting that the 
beliefs of claimants are sincere, and that their manifestations of belief are of central significance to 
their lives—is in marked contrast to the third, where the arguments of claimants have often been 
superseded by a judicial willingness to find that the measures taken by the state to impose restrictions 
on these manifestations have been justified. 
 
(i) Is it a Religion or Belief? 
In examining complaints under Article 9 of the ECHR, the court must first make sure that the 
litigant’s avowed ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ is ‘neither fictitious nor capricious’, and is actually protected 
by Article 9.51 However, beyond this, judges refuse to inquire as to the asserted belief’s ‘validity’ in 
relation to the doctrines of the religion in question,52 and will not assess ‘the extent to which the 
claimant’s belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same religion’.53 Thus, 
only rarely will an applicant fail to surmount this initial threshold, because the courts have tended to 
afford great weight to what the claimant maintains is his/her religion or belief.54 
                                                          
50 [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 AC 246. 
51 Ibid, [22] (Lord Nicholls), quoting Iaccobucci J in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem (2004) 241 DLR 
(4th) 1, 27 at [52]. 
52 See Blake v Associated Newspapers [2003] EWHC 1960 (QB), [21], Gray J.  
53 See Williamson (n 50) [22] (Lord Nicholls); Varsani v Jesani [1999] Ch 219; R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte 
Wackman [1992] 1 WLR 1036. 
54 In Williamson (n 50) Lord Nicholls expressed the view that a person is free to hold their religious 
beliefs no matter how ‘irrational or inconsistent they may seem to some’ (at [22]). 
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(ii) Is it a ‘Manifestation’ of Religion or Belief? 
A second issue that judges must address relates to the manifestation of religion or belief. The vast 
majority of challenges under Article 9 usually involve manifestations of religion or belief, for it is 
only when a religion or belief emerges into the external domain (ie the forum externum) that it is 
likely to attract the restrictive attention of the state.55 In relation to the issue of manifestation, a 
person’s belief must relate to matters that are ‘more than merely trivial’, ‘possess an adequate degree 
of seriousness and importance’, and be consistent with ‘basic standards of human dignity and 
integrity’.56 However, once these minimal thresholds have been satisfied (as with question (i) above), 
the courts have generally been reluctant to enquire any further,57 because religious belief ‘is not 
always susceptible to lucid exposition or, still less, rational justification’.58 Thus, the courts are 
usually willing to accept the submissions of claimants that their faith has to be manifested in a 
particular way.  
 
(iii) Is the Interference Justified? 
A different approach, however, is evident where judges consider whether manifestations of religion or 
belief may justifiably be subjected to limitations. In such circumstances, the courts must examine not 
                                                          
55 Whilst Art 9 applies to non-religious beliefs and philosophies (‘thought and conscience’), the notion of 
manifestation is ‘particularly appropriate to the area or religious belief’: Williamson (n 50) [62] (Lord Walker). 
Manifestations of ‘thought and conscience’ are protected by Art 10 ECHR. See Malcolm D Evans, Religious 
Liberty and International Law in Europe (Cambridge University Press, 1997) 284–6. 
56 Williamson (n 50) [23] (Lord Nicholls), [62] (Lord Walker). 
57 A rare example of a failure to surmount this threshold requirement of manifestation can be seen in R 
(Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 (Admin), where the wearing of a ‘purity 
ring’ by a Christian school pupil, which contravened the school’s no jewellery policy, was found not to be 
intimately linked to the belief in chastity before marriage.  
58 Williamson (n 50) [23] (Lord Nicholls). 
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just whether a particular manifestation of belief has been ‘prescribed by law’,59 but whether it can also 
be restricted as being ‘necessary in a democratic society’ in the pursuit of one of the legitimate aims 
listed in Article 9(2). Typically this means that the court must ask whether the limitation on religious 
freedom constitutes a proportionate response to a ‘pressing social need’.60  
The exact form and content of proportionality, as developed by the domestic courts under the HRA, is 
far from clear, one commentator having described the case law as being ‘murky’ and a ‘muddle’.61 
The analysis and formulation most widely accepted and cited is that of Lord Steyn in R (on the 
application of Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.62 This three-stage test, drawn 
from the Privy Council decision in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture,63 asks 
whether: (1) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right 
(which corresponds roughly to the question of whether a legitimate aim is being sought); (2) the 
measures designed to meet the objective are rationally connected to it; and (3) the means used to 
impair the right are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective. It is at the third stage that 
the bulk of the judicial assessment of whether the interference with the right is proportionate takes 
                                                          
59 See Kokkinakis v Greece (n 11) [37]–[41]. 
60 Ibid, [27]–[41]. There is an ongoing debate concerning what a proper proportionality analysis, in a 
human rights context, requires. In particular, there is argument about whether the concept of ‘balancing’ rights 
against public interests is appropriate in human rights adjudication, especially since it seems to require a 
mechanistic weighing of incommensurable values. See eg Steven Greer, ‘“Balancing” and the European Court 
of Human Rights: A Contribution to the Alexy-Habermas Debate’ (2004) 63(2) Cambridge Law Journal 412; 
Stavros Tsakyrakis, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?’ (2009) 7(3) International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 468; Madhav Khosla, ‘Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?: A Reply’ (2010) 8(2) 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 298.  
61 Tom Hickman, ‘The Structure and Substance of Proportionality’ [2008] Public Law 694, 711. 
62 [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, [25]. The formulation was approved by the House of Lords in 
Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167, [13]. 
63 [1999] 1 AC 69, 80. The Privy Council in turn drew the test from the Canadian case of R v Oakes 
[1986] 1 SCR 103.  
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place. There is debate about what exactly this stage requires.64 However, some clarity was provided 
by the House of Lords in Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department. In a Joint Opinion 
their Lordships approved of the three-stage de Freitas test, but also stated that any judgment on 
proportionality ‘must always involve the striking of a fair balance between the rights of the individual 
and the interests of the community’, and that the ‘severity and consequences of the interference will 
call for careful assessment at this stage’.65 
There have been several examples of cases where the courts have examined the proportionality of 
interferences with the manifestation of religious beliefs, although the structured tests set out above 
have only been sporadically referred to, still less applied with any degree of rigour. In Williamson,66 
the claimants (the head-teachers, teachers and parents of children at four independent Christian 
schools) argued that corporal punishment of pupils should be permitted at school, on the basis of their 
belief in the Biblical injunction, ‘He who spares the rod hates his son, but he who loves him is diligent 
to discipline him’.67 The House of Lords held unanimously that whilst this was a manifestation of 
belief, it could be legitimately interfered with in order to protect the physical and mental well-being of 
children. Without citing the de Freitas test, their Lordships nevertheless had no difficulty in reaching 
this conclusion because the statutory ban pursued a legitimate aim—the protection of children who 
are vulnerable from the deliberate infliction of physical violence, and the pain and suffering which 
this would cause. And, their Lordships held, the ban on corporal punishment was not a 
disproportionate interference with the claimants’ rights, since the legislature had been entitled to take 
the view that such punishment in the classroom was undesirable and unnecessary.68  
                                                          
64 Hickman (n 61); Julian Rivers, ‘Proportionality and the Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65(1) 
Cambridge Law Journal 174. 
65 [2007] UKHL 11, [2007] 2 AC 167, [19].  
66 Williamson (n 50). 
67 The Bible, Proverbs 13:24.  
68 Williamson (n 50) [49]–[50] (Lord Nicholls); [69] (Lord Walker); [86] (Baroness Hale). Lords 
Bingham and Brown also agreed.  
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Another example of a lawful curb on religious freedom is R (Suryananda) v Welsh Ministers,69 which 
concerned a Hindu religious community (the Community of the Many Names of God) in South West 
Wales, whose members believe that all life (both human and animal) is sacred. In an effort to control 
the spread of bovine tuberculosis (bTB), which was a particularly serious problem in this area, the 
Welsh Assembly Government ordered the slaughter of Shambo, the sacred temple bull, which had 
tested positive as having been exposed to the bTB bacterium.70 All of the parties accepted that, for this 
religious community, the bull’s destruction ‘would be a particularly sacrilegious act, a serious 
desecration of the temple, and comparable … to the killing of a human being’.71 Thomas LJ put it 
thus: 
 
The cornerstone of the beliefs of the … Community is the sanctity of life and the worship 
of God through caring for its animals. The respondent is utterly committed to the 
preservation of this life, regarding all animals as having a spark of divinity. The 
Community would regard the slaughter of the bullock as a sacrilege and a desecration of 
their temple.72  
 
The Community’s beliefs in relation to the religious significance of Shambo were found to be 
‘patently sincere and most deeply held’.73 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held, unanimously, that 
the destruction was a proportionate response to the serious threat to animal and public health, and 
necessary as part of the overall policy of controlling the spread of the disease, in order to protect the 
agricultural industry, animal welfare and public health.74  
                                                          
69 [2007] EWCA Civ 893. 
70 An infection of bTB but not necessarily the disease, which is detected through post-mortem testing. 
71 Suryananda (n 69) [3] (Pill LJ), quoting R (Suryananda) v Welsh Ministers [2007] EWHC 1736 
(Admin), [17] (Hickinbottom J). 
72 Ibid, [83] (Thomas LJ). 
73 Ibid, [3] (Pill LJ). 
74 Pill LJ quoted the Government Veterinary Journal which referred to bTB as ‘the most difficult animal 
health programme we face in Great Britain today’ (at [4]). 
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Finally, the case of R (Begum) v Governors of Denbigh High School, where a 15-year-old Muslim 
school girl (Shabina Begum) argued that her faith required her to wear a jilbab (a long, loose fitting 
over-garment) in contravention of her school’s uniform policy, is another example of the judiciary 
having to consider the legality of restrictions on religious freedom. The majority of the House of 
Lords held that there had been no interference with Begum’s Article 9 rights because she could have 
attended another school which permitted the jilbab. Nevertheless several of their Lordships took the 
opportunity to examine the proportionality of the measure at issue.75 Whilst accepting that the 
claimant was sincere in her beliefs, the House of Lords held that the school’s policy, which 
accommodated to a large extent the beliefs of ‘mainstream’ Muslim pupils by allowing the headscarf 
and shalwar kameeze, was justified, for it ultimately protected social harmony within the school and 
the rights of other pupils. 
Factual differences aside, the approach of the courts in Begum, Suryananda and Williamson was 
similar, for in each of these three cases a margin of discretion was accorded to the primary decision-
makers. The implications of this judicial tendency to defer to primary decision-makers in relation to 
determinations under Article 9 of the ECHR will now be explored in more detail.  
 
B. Judicial Deference and Article 9 
A key element of the proportionality question that judges must consider in regard to Article 9 is 
whether the courts should afford a degree of latitude to executive/legislative decision-makers in 
seeking to balance the rights of the believer and the public interest. In this respect the European Court 
has typically granted states a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ in relation to the imposition of restrictions 
on manifestations of religion or belief.76 The granting of this margin has been justified on the basis 
                                                          
75 [2006] UKHL 15, [2005] 5 WLR 3372, [26]–[34] (Lord Bingham); [58]–[68] (Lord Hoffmann); [86]–
[88] (Lord Scott); [94]–[98] (Baroness Hale). Strictly speaking, since the majority had found there to be no 
interference with the claimant’s Art 9 rights their Lordships were not compelled to consider the proportionality 
of the measure. 
76 On the margin of appreciation generally, see George Letsas, ‘Two Concepts of the Margin of 
Appreciation’ (2006) 26(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 705; Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of 
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that, within the member states of the Council of Europe, there is little consensus on the significance of 
religion in society and that, as a consequence, states should be given a certain leeway as to what 
restrictions they may impose. Thus, for example, in Şahin v Turkey—a case concerning the banning of 
the Islamic headscarf in Turkish universities in order to preserve their secular nature and the principle 
of gender equality—the Grand Chamber of the European Court held: 
 
It is not possible to discern throughout Europe a uniform conception of the significance 
of religion in society and the meaning or impact of the public expression of a religious 
belief will differ according to time and context.77 
 
This latitude granted to states by the European Court has distinct echoes in the domestic Article 9 case 
law.78 Indeed, in Begum, Lord Hoffmann expressly stated that the margin of appreciation granted at 
Strasbourg should be reflected in the adjudications of domestic courts:  
 
In applying the principles in Şahin v Turkey the justification [for restriction] must be 
sought at the local level and it is there that an area of judgment, comparable to the 
margin of appreciation, must be allowed to the school. 79  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 
2002).  
77 Şahin v Turkey (n 48) [109] (citations omitted). See also Dogru v France (2009) 49 EHRR 8, [63]; 
Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court and the Margin of Appreciation’ (2007) 
56(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 395. 
78 On the issue of judicial deference under the HRA see R v DPP, ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326, 
380–1 (Lord Hope); International Transport Roth GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] 
EWCA Civ 158, [83]–[87] (Laws LJ); R (ProLife Alliance) v BBC [2004] 1 AC 185, [74]–[77] (Lord 
Hoffmann); Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’ [2005] Public Law 346. The use of the term ‘deference’ 
was called into question by Lord Hoffmann in ProLife, due to its ‘overtones of servility, or perhaps gracious 
concession’ (at [75]). 
79 Begum (n 75) [64]. 
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The affording of latitude by domestic courts to other decision-makers has been justified on at least 
two grounds: first, on the basis that the other body possesses greater democratic legitimacy—that it is 
elected and its members ‘face the consequences of their decisions through their accountability to the 
electorate’;80 and secondly, on the ground that the decision-maker has greater expertise or ‘relative 
institutional capacity’ than the court in the area under review.81  
In all of the domestic decisions outlined above in which proportionality was considered, at least some 
degree of latitude was afforded to legislative or executive decision-makers based on either their 
democratic legitimacy or their institutional competence and expertise. An example of the former can 
be seen in Williamson, where, given the legislative aim (the prevention of physical and mental harm 
to children), their Lordships held that Parliament was entitled to take the view that all corporal 
punishment at school was undesirable and unnecessary.82 It was therefore to be accorded a 
‘considerable degree of latitude’ in this regard.83 An example of the latter can be seen in Suryananda, 
where a margin of discretion was granted to the Minister (acting on expert veterinary advice) in 
                                                          
80 Sandra Fredman, ‘From Deference to Democracy: The Role of Equality under the Human Rights Act 
1998’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly Review 53, 56. In Kebilene (n 78) Lord Hope said that ‘[i]n some 
circumstances it will be appropriate for the courts to recognise that there is an area of judgment within which the 
judiciary will defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body …’ (380–1).  
81 Fredman (n 80); Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional  
Capacity’  [2003] Public Law 592. The validity of the justification that deference should be afforded to 
decision-makers due solely to their accountability to an electorate has been called into question. See Hickman (n 
61) 697 fn 14 for a useful summary of the authorities. It may be the case, of course, that elected officials could 
indeed be said to possess ‘greater expertise’ on a particular issue if it pertains to a question of public opinion or 
public confidence, or how best to tackle a particular social problem.  
82 Williamson (n 50) [49]–[50] (Lord Nicholls); [69] (Lord Walker); [86] (Baroness Hale). Lords 
Bingham and Brown agreed.  
83 Ibid, [51]. It is arguable that this is a case in which latitude was afforded not on the basis of democratic 
credentials alone, but rather because MPs possessed greater expertise on the issue—it being a difficult one of 
morality and social policy.  
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respect of the order to slaughter Shambo, so as to prevent the spread of bTB. Thomas LJ commented 
that: 
 
… as the views held by the Minister’s advisers were, on the evidence, in conformity with 
well recognised veterinary and medical opinion, the views of those experts must be given 
significant weight when considering the margin of discretion to be accorded to the 
Minister. 
… On the totality of the evidence and according a significant margin of discretion to the 
Minister, I have come therefore to the firm conclusion that the decision to slaughter is 
justified under Article 9(2) as proportionate in both effect and scope …84  
 
Similarly, in Begum their Lordships held that special weight should be given to the decision of the 
school on the balance to be struck in attempting to secure peace and harmony within the multi-
cultural, multi-faith educational environment. According to Lord Bingham:  
 
It was feared that acceding to the respondent’s request would or might have significant 
adverse repercussions. It would … be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, 
background and detailed knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors, to overrule 
their judgment on a matter as sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to 
them for the compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it, and I see no 
reason to disturb their decision.85 
 
The judges’ adjudicative task, in all of the domestic cases discussed above, was made easier by the 
fact that the public goods that were being pursued were relatively clear cut (eg  protecting the physical 
and mental integrity of children, preventing the spread of an animal disease which posed a serious 
threat to the rural economy, and preserving social harmony in a religiously and racially diverse 
school). Indeed, it is arguable that the harms (or potential harms) being obviated in the cases above 
were sufficiently clear for the restricting measures to have been justified as proportionate, even 
                                                          
84 Suryananda (n 69) [79]–[80] (Thomas LJ) (emphasis added). 
85 Begum (n 75) [34] (Lord Bingham). See also [63]–[64] (Lord Hoffmann); [84] (Lord Scott); [97] 
(Baroness Hale). 
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without a significant margin of discretion being afforded by the courts to the respective decision-
makers. 
As a consequence, it may be that the true difficulties of adjudicating such claims have, at least to 
some extent, been masked. In the Article 9 cases that have come before the UK courts to date, judges 
have effectively been ‘let off the hook’ of having to really grapple with the question of the appropriate 
weight/value to be accorded to religious manifestation and practice.  
In some ways the recent case of Ghai v Newcastle City Council provides a better illustration of the 
difficulties that courts encounter in adjudicating religious rights claims.86 Its specific facts—in 
particular the unparalleled importance to the individual concerned of the religious right claimed 
(cremation on an outdoor funeral pyre)—and the relatively trivial harm that was sought to be 
prevented by its restriction (prevention of offence to those who might be aware that cremations were 
taking place, without witnessing them directly) mean that the issues discussed above are thrown into 
especially sharp relief. Our analysis of Ghai—and in particular the decision of Cranston J in the 
Administrative Court, where he dealt with the human rights issues that the Court of Appeal pointedly 
refrained from examining—will form the basis of the next section.  
 
4. Ghai v Newcastle City Council 
A. The Facts and Decision in Ghai v Newcastle City Council  
 
Davender Ghai, an orthodox Hindu, believed that in order to achieve a ‘good death’ and a successful 
passage to the afterlife his remains needed to be cremated on an outdoor funeral pyre. He believed 
that fire is the embodiment of the god Agni, and this final sacrifice to him, a Vedic rite known as the 
anthyesthi samskara, was vital so that his soul could be ‘propelled on a transcendental journey 
towards the land of the forefathers and gods’.87 Anything less would have ‘devastating effects for him 
in the afterlife’, interrupting his cycle of birth and rebirth, possibly irreparably. However, Newcastle 
                                                          
86 Ghai (Admin) (n 1) 151. 
87 Ibid, [22].  
24 
 
City Council refused his request for permission to be cremated on a funeral pyre, insisting that section 
2 of the Cremation Act 1902 (and associated regulations)88 required that all cremations be carried out 
in a ‘building’ and, as a consequence, open-air funeral pyres were unlawful. Mr Ghai then sought 
judicial review, claiming that, if the legislation did indeed render open-air funeral pyres unlawful, this 
would be a breach of his Article 9 rights. The Secretary of State for Justice, the Minister responsible 
for cremation law, also made representations as an interested party.89  
Ultimately the case ended in victory for Mr Ghai. The Court of Appeal established that cremation 
within a walled enclosure, open to the sunlight, would be in conformity with Ghai’s beliefs and held, 
as a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation, that such a structure could constitute a ‘building’ for 
the purposes of the Cremation Act 1902. Consequently, a funeral pyre within such an enclosure would 
not be unlawful after all.90 As a result, the Court of Appeal avoided having to engage with issues 
pertaining to Article 9 and the manifestation of religious belief to any meaningful extent. However, a 
different approach was taken at first instance by Cranston J, who held that the law prohibited open-air 
funeral pyres, and considered at length the question of whether this apparent prohibition breached Mr 
Ghai’s Article 9 rights. Cranston J’s judgment is particularly significant because it clearly highlights 
the difficulties encountered by the courts in cases involving religious rights.  
Adopting the methodology set out in Williamson, Cranston J held that athyesthi samskara was a 
manifestation of a genuine belief held in good faith.91 Although certain ‘minimum thresholds relating 
to seriousness, coherence and conformity’ had to be satisfied,92 it was ‘emphatically not for the court 
to embark on an inquiry as to the validity of a belief by some standard such as a religious text or 
                                                          
88 Crematorium (England and Wales) Regulations 2008 (SI 2008/2841). 
89 Indeed, it was the Secretary of State for Justice who put the arguments for the defence. See Ghai 
(Admin) (n 1) [93]–[98]. A Sikh temple and an organisation advocating natural burial methods also made 
representations. 
90 R (Ghai) v Newcastle City Council (Ramgharia Gurdwara, Hitchin and another intervening) [2010] 
EWCA Civ 59, [2010] 3 WLR 737.  
91 Ghai (Admin) (n 1) [101]. 
92 Ibid, [87]. 
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whether it conforms [to] or differs from that of others professing the same religion’.93 Furthermore, 
there had been an interference with the manifestation of the claimant’s beliefs, because the Act and 
Regulations ‘stifled his desire to have an open air pyre’.94  
The judge then proceeded to consider the proportionality of the statutory curbs on open-air cremation. 
In this regard he accepted that it was necessary to ban open-air funeral pyres, not because they would 
pose a risk to public safety or the environment, but rather because many people would find it 
‘abhorrent that human remains were being burned in this manner’.95 Relying on the European Court’s 
judgment in Otto Preminger Institute v Austria,96 Cranston J held that it was a legitimate aim of the 
legislation to prevent such offence being caused, and this was the case even though there was little 
prospect of anyone ‘unintentionally’ witnessing funeral pyres, for open-air cremations could be held 
in secluded places out of public sight.97  
In view of the fact that this was ‘difficult and delicate territory’, Cranston J held that those who were 
democratically elected, ‘with the legitimacy which election confers’, were ‘better placed than a court 
to decide where the balance [lay]’. Moreover, because this was a ‘matter where opinions reasonably 
                                                          
93 Ibid, [88]. 
94 Ibid, [101]. 
95 Ibid, [105]. The judge also referred to other factors forming the ‘backdrop’ to his conclusion that the 
ban was proportionate: there was no blanket interference with the claimant’s rights since he was still permitted 
to manifest his belief in other ways; the ‘vast majority’ of UK Hindus did not require outdoor cremation; there 
was no significant evidence that there had been significant cultural change in relation to the disposal of human 
remains since the passage of the Cremation Act 1902; and there was an absence of any European consensus on 
the issue of outdoor cremation. For a detailed analysis and critique of these arguments see Peter Cumper and 
Tom Lewis, ‘Last Rites and Human Rights: Funeral Pyres and Religious Freedom in the United Kingdom’ 
(2010) 12(2) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 131. 
96 Otto Preminger Institute v Austria (1995) 19 EHRR 34. 
97 Ghai (Admin) (n 1) [108].  
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differ[ed]’, the ‘balance [to be] struck by elected representatives [was] entitled to be given special 
weight’.98 As a result, Cranston J commented that the Minister was entitled to conclude: 
 
… that the present legislative framework [was] consistent with mainstream cultural 
expectations of persons living in this country and secure[d] in a practical way the 
avoidance of likely offence and distress. That calculation [was] not one on which a judge 
c[ould] speak with any great expertise or authority. The resolution of the various 
competing interests on this difficult and delicate issue by elected representatives [was] 
not one a court should easily set aside. It [was] within the remit of the Secretary of State 
to conclude … that a significant number of people would find both the principle and the 
reality of cremation by means of open air pyres to be a matter of offence.99 
 
Thus, Cranston J held that there was no breach of Article 9 because the (supposed) legislative ban on 
funeral pyres was a proportionate response to the need to protect the sensibilities of the majority 
population. 
This conclusion, and the deferential stance that led to it, sit uneasily with Cranston J’s approach to the 
claimant’s beliefs in the preliminary stages of his analysis. After all, early in his judgment, he 
expressly acknowledged not just that the performance of the sacrament anthyesthi samskara was a 
bona fide manifestation of the claimant’s religious beliefs, but also that Mr Ghai genuinely believed 
that failure to perform it would have extremely grave consequences for him. Yet when it came to 
consideration of the proportionality of the prohibition, Cranston J readily deferred to the 
Government’s view that it was necessary to prohibit this ritual so as to avoid possible offence to those 
who, whilst not personally witnessing such a funeral pyre, might object to it merely taking place. The 
type of offence being envisaged was thus indirect or secondary in nature since it would be caused not 
                                                          
98 Ibid, [121]. Cranston J cited Otto Preminger (n 96) and Şahin (n 77) in support of this point.  
99 Ibid, [122]. 
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by direct sensory contact with the activity in question, but rather at the mere thought of such activity 
occurring.100 
It is this disconnect—between the acknowledged existential import of the religious practice to the 
individual believer, and the relatively trivial and attenuated nature of the purported ‘harm’ which the 
supposed ban was attempting to obviate—that is particularly significant in this case. In particular, it 
throws into clear focus the difficulties that the courts encounter when adjudicating religious rights, 
and it is to this issue that we now turn.  
 
B. Talking the Talk, But Not Walking the Walk: ‘What is Going On?’ 
Writing during the outwash of the Satanic Verses affair, Salman Rushdie posed a question which 
perhaps gets close to the heart of the issue considered above: ‘If we accept that the mystic, the 
prophet, is sincerely undergoing some sort of transcendent experience, but we cannot believe in a 
supernatural world, then what is going on?’101 To put this into the context of Davender Ghai’s case, 
the followers of his ‘strand of orthodox Hinduism’102 believe that fire is the embodiment of the god 
Agni, and that their failure to perform a final sacrifice to him, by way of cremation on an outdoor 
funeral pyre (in strict accordance with the Vedas), will interrupt the cycle of birth/rebirth and harm the 
future course of the soul, perhaps for all eternity.103 For Mr Ghai, therefore, the matter could not be 
more serious. Even though, from a purely rationalist perspective, such beliefs might seem at best 
incomprehensible, and at worst verging on the insane,104 the court nevertheless accepted that he 
                                                          
100 There are serious difficulties of principle in restricting otherwise harmless conduct on the grounds of 
such secondary offence. See Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others (Oxford 
University Press, 1985) especially 33–35. 
101 Salman Rushdie, ‘In Good Faith’ in Salman Rushdie, Imaginary Homelands (Granta, 1991) 408, cited 
in Bradney (n 46) (emphasis in original). 
102 Ghai (Admin) (n 1) [101]. 
103 Ibid, [22]–[23]. 
104 Of course, such a critique could be levelled at aspects of all religions, though the beliefs do not seem so 
outlandish in those religions—especially Catholicism and Protestantism—that have seen centuries of 
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sincerely believed that these calamitous consequences would ensue if he were to be denied his funeral 
pyre: that such a denial would, for him, be worse than fatal. Nevertheless, the Administrative Court 
was still prepared to grant considerable latitude to the Government, accepting, virtually without 
question, the Minister’s assertion that a ban on funeral pyres was necessary to prevent possible 
offence to the public.105 
As we grapple with this state of affairs, the Rawlsian doctrine of public reason might offer guidance 
in helping to explain ‘what is going on’. In cases involving restrictions on manifestations of religious 
belief, any reasons that the court may give for attributing value to a particular religious practice are 
unlikely to be the same as those given by a believer for that practice.106 For example, the reason why 
Davender Ghai valued the rite of funeral pyre cremation was because of his belief in the necessity of a 
final sacrifice to the fire god, so that his soul could progress to the ‘afterlife of forefathers and gods’. 
Yet the court could not use this as a rationale for justifying the practice, by balancing it against the 
state’s arguments for restriction. After all, to have done so would have been to have used reasons 
drawn from a comprehensive world view, inaccessible and incomprehensible to others, and cutting 
against that core tenet of public reason: that the courts, as exemplars of public reason, must justify 
their decisions with publicly accessible reasons which any reasonable person can accept. Perhaps 
something of the sense of this profound inaccessibility of the reasons why believers value their 
religious practices is captured by Jürgen Habermas in his observation that the 
 
core [of religious experience] remains as profoundly alien to discursive thought as the 
hermetic core of aesthetic experience, which likewise can be at best circumscribed, but 
not penetrated, by philosophical reflection.107  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
institutionalisation and habituation within Europe. See, generally, Harold J Berman, ‘The Influence of 
Christianity upon the Development of Law’ (1959) 12 Oklahoma Law Review 86.  
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There certainly exist generally accessible reasons that ‘any reasonable person could accept’, on the 
basis of which the court might attribute value to manifestations of religious belief. Indeed, the stock 
phrase employed by the European Court of Human Rights itself seeks to explain the importance of 
freedom of religion and belief in terms of public reason: 
 
… freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of ‘democratic 
society’ … one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and 
their conception of the good life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, 
which has been dearly won over the centuries depends upon it.108 
 
This passage is suffused with public reason: religion is important because it is a key element in the 
‘identity of believers’ and ‘their conception of the good life’; and it is a vital component of the 
‘pluralism indissociable from a democratic society’.109 But whilst these reasons satisfy the 
requirements of public reason, as understood in the context of a contemporary liberal democracy, the 
European Court’s rhetoric fails to capture the sense of why certain tenets of religious belief, and their 
manifestation, are of such great importance to particular religious believers themselves. 
Similarly, returning to Ghai, the Administrative Court could have afforded weight to the religious 
manifestation in question (balanced against state arguments for restriction), on the basis that there are 
clear benefits for a democratic society if it nurtures pluralism and fosters tolerance.110 In addition, it 
would have been possible for the court to have attributed such value on the basis that human beings, 
as rational autonomous agents, should be accorded a determinative role in deciding how their remains 
are to be treated after death.111 Yet, for Mr Ghai, the problem with these arguments would have been 
                                                          
108 Kokkinakis (n 59) [31]. 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Françoise Tulkens, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Pluralism vs Pluralism’ (2009) 
36(6) Cardozo Law Review 2575. 
111 The principle of autonomy poses problems for many religious groups and, as Rawls argues, is itself a 
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that, whilst graspable from a public reason point of view, they would not have come close to 
communicating the immense, existential significance of the rite to him.112 In such cases the only 
reasons that ‘fit the bill’ in terms of Rawlsian public reason (ie reasons that ‘any reasonable person 
could accept’) are of a generalised character, which are incapable of conveying the ‘particularity’ of 
the claimant’s belief and its subjective importance.113  
By way of contrast it is at least arguable that, in respect of some other ECHR rights, there is a much 
closer correlation between the subjective reasons for them being valued by claimants invoking them, 
and the public reasons that courts can invoke in support of their protection. For example, it is 
axiomatic that freedom of political expression, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, is vital for the 
maintenance of a democratic society.114 This is a generally accessible ‘public reason’, which helps to 
explain why those exercising this right subjectively see it as being of such importance, as well as one 
of the reasons why the courts afford it a high level of protection. Thus, whilst both subjective and 
objective reasons can be adduced as to why freedom of political expression is unquestionably a public 
‘good’, similar considerations tend not to apply to the manifestation of religion or belief.  
 
5. Religion, Belief and Public Reason: What is to be Done? 
Factors such as those discussed above help to explain the almost palpable sense of judicial unease 
whenever courts have to adjudicate on issues pertaining to manifestations of religious belief.115 As 
Benjamin Berger points out, the law ‘displays a kind of anxiety and awkwardness with religion as 
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113 See Wolterstorff (n 8) 110.  
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Lingens v Austria (1986) 8 EHRR 407, [42]; Castells v Spain (1992) 14 EHRR 445, [42]; R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115,1 26 (Lord Steyn); VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v 
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practice’,116 and an obvious problem associated with religious human rights claims is that the reasons 
for the importance of religious practices to believers seldom correspond with those that courts are able 
to take into account. Indeed, the task facing judges in such cases is made even harder by the fact that 
religious commitment is, as Robert Audi observes, ‘a complex, multi-layered fidelity to a multifarious 
array of texts, traditions, authoritative directives [and] religious experiences’, rather than just ‘a 
monolithic position of blind obedience’.117 Accordingly, in the absence of clear and relevant public 
reasons which can be balanced against the arguments for restriction, the tendency of courts to adopt a 
‘posture … of deference’ when ruling on religious cases is certainly understandable.118 
This deferential stance is, however, problematic. For it effectively reduces the level of protection 
afforded to those manifesting religious belief in comparison to those claiming other rights, where such 
deference is not traditionally shown.119 Moreover, this diminution in protection is accentuated by 
virtue of the disconnect associated with judges saying that they accept the vital importance of faith in 
the lives of particular individuals, yet, in almost the very next breath, choosing to defer to the state in 
accepting the necessity of curbs on the manifestation of religion and belief. Of course, this is not to 
say that, as a general rule, there is necessarily anything wrong with the courts recognising litigants’ 
strongly held views, and then not allowing these subjective views to shape the objective contours of 
the right in question.120 But if the discrepancy between judges’ words and actions continues to be 
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replicated in future Article 9 cases, this may confirm the fears of those who complain that freedom of 
religion is taken less seriously than other rights that can be more easily justified on the basis of public 
reason.121 
With claims that religious belief is under threat from ‘rampant secularism … of the most intolerant 
and illiberal sort’,122 the danger is that many in religious communities will come to regard ‘secular’ 
human rights laws as offering them little chance of success, with the adjudicative deck of cards 
essentially stacked against them from the outset. At best this could lead to increasing disenchantment 
with the legal process—and at worst might even provoke anger in faith communities, ultimately 
leading to ‘civil unrest’.123  
In spite of the apparent intractability of this problem, we contend that the solution is deceptively 
straightforward. It should certainly not be for courts to start drawing on reasons from comprehensive 
doctrines, as perhaps intimated by Lord Carey, which would undermine long held liberal notions of 
religious freedom. Instead, a preferable way forward would be for the courts, when adjudicating 
religious rights cases, to afford less deference to Government and Parliament. This would make it 
possible for judges to engage in a meaningful analysis of the proportionality of the restrictive 
measure(s) at issue, and enable them to facilitate the ‘striking of a fair balance between the rights of 
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the individual and the interests of the community’.124 Such an approach would make it possible for the 
particular importance of the religious manifestation to the individual concerned to be given weight at 
this stage rather than (as has hitherto often been the case) being simply acknowledged at an earlier 
point in the analysis, only to be subsequently discarded.125 Indeed, the House of Lords in Huang, it 
will be recalled, stressed not only that a proper proportionality requires the ‘striking of a fair balance’ 
but also that the ‘severity and consequences of the interference will call for careful assessment at this 
stage’.126 Clearly some judicial recognition of the subjectively felt impact of the interference—that is 
to say, some acknowledgement of its ‘severity and consequences’ at ‘this stage’ in the analysis—
would be facilitated by a diminution of the latitude accorded to other decision-makers. 
If this ‘less deferential’ approach were to be adopted, the state could still legitimately restrict harmful 
practices based upon religion or belief. In cases where there were strong arguments in favour of the 
restriction of religious practice, judicial abstinence from the use of deference would (seemingly) make 
little difference to the outcome. For example, it is unlikely that any diminution in the margin of 
discretion afforded to decision-makers would have altered the result in Williamson, where the 
religious beliefs of parents and teachers regarding the use corporal punishment were weighed against 
the rights of pupils to be protected from physical violence.127 Indeed, a straightforward balancing of 
the religious rights of Christian parents/teachers against the rights of children to physical and mental 
integrity could have led to this result without the court having to adopt a deferential stance. Similarly 
in Suryananda—albeit perhaps rather less clearly so, given the possibilities of quarantining the 
bullock and the claimant’s belief that the animal’s slaughter would be the equivalent of taking a 
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human life—the need to prevent the spread of bTB in order to protect the important goods of public 
health, the rural economy and animal welfare could (arguably) have constituted sufficiently powerful 
grounds to have justified slaughtering the sacred bull without any need for the court to have afforded 
‘a significant margin of discretion to the Minister’ concerned.128  
In Ghai the Administrative Court’s deferential approach resulted, as we have seen, in an extremely 
tenuous state aim—the prevention of offence to those who would not witness funeral pyres directly, 
but might be aware that they were taking place—being allowed to override the crucial manifestation 
of the claimant’s deeply held religious belief. In contrast, if the courts were self-consciously to reduce 
the latitude afforded, this would create space for an assessment of the ‘severity and consequences’ of 
the interference for the particular believer. This, necessarily, would require some judicial assessment 
of the subjective importance of the religious manifestation, thereby affording it greater relative weight 
in the balance at the proportionality stage of the analysis. This approach, we argue, would have at 
least two advantages. First, it would stop short of the court undermining the principles of public 
reason, for the court would be neither affirming the truth of, nor resorting to, a comprehensive 
doctrine. Secondly, for religious litigants such as Davender Ghai, there would be the reassurance that 
the frequent judicial comments about the sincerity and importance of their beliefs amounted to more 
than empty rhetoric. Such a development would also be particularly welcome on the basis that it 
might assuage the fears of the representatives of several religious organisations who have, in recent 
years, expressed dissatisfaction with the nation’s legal process and its protection of religious belief.129 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The question as to whether UK law affords proper respect to religious belief provokes widely varying 
opinions,130 but what seems beyond dispute is that the challenges facing British judges in this area are 
immense. The Britain of half a century ago—a largely mono-cultural, white, ‘Christian’ country—has 
today been transformed into one of the most cosmopolitan and secular societies in Europe.131 As a 
result Britain’s judges have the invidious task of ensuring that the law affords proper respect to a 
variety of faiths and beliefs in what is a culturally and religiously diverse nation. Mindful of such 
considerations, the aim of this article has been to suggest that if judges are to be seen as taking the 
human right to freedom of religion and belief seriously, they should refrain from granting an 
excessive margin of discretion to executive and legislative decision-makers when considering claims 
submitted under Article 9. 
The fact that there has long been an ‘uneasy relationship’ between human rights norms and religious 
values doubtlessly makes the task of adjudication harder in this most controversial of areas.132 Indeed, 
with Britain’s judges having to resolve an increasing number of ever more complex disputes with a 
religious dimension,133 this article has only been able to skim the surface of what are very deep 
waters. In this regard it is perhaps apposite to turn to Jürgen Habermas, who, commenting on the 
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doctrine of public reason as applied to citizens, provides us with a hint of a compass bearing on these 
treacherous seas: 
 
… the recognition by secular citizens that they live in a postsecular society that is also 
epistemically attuned to the continued existence of religious communities is a 
consequence of a change in mentality that is no less cognitively exacting than the 
adaptation of religious consciousness to the challenges of an environment that is 
becoming progressively more secular.134  
 
Such epistemic tuning, we emphatically reiterate, must not be effected by the courts directly adopting 
reasons drawn from comprehensive doctrines. But it could be accomplished if judges were to show 
less deference to the state in religious rights cases, so that applicants find themselves on, and crucially 
believe themselves to be on, a level playing field.   
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